Axiomatic foundation and a structured process for developing firm-specific Intuitive Logics scenarios by Phadnis, Shardul et al.
 (1) 
Axiomatic foundation and a structured process for developing 
firm-specific Intuitive Logics scenarios 
 
 
Shardul Phadnis*
a
, Chris Caplice
 b
, Mahender Singh
 c 1
, Yossi Sheffi
 d
 
 
 
 
a,b,c,d 
All authors affiliation and address 
Center for Transportation & Logistics 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
77 Massachusetts Ave E40-275 
Cambridge, MA 02139 
USA 
 
Email addresses 
Shardul@mit.edu 
a
 
Caplice@mit.edu 
b
 
msingh@mit.edu 
c
 
Sheffi@mit.edu 
d
 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author contact information 
Dr. Shardul Phadnis 
Postdoctoral Associate, Center for Transportation & Logistics 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
77 Massachusetts Ave E40-207 
Cambridge, MA 02139 
USA 
shardul@mit.edu  
Phone: 617.258.8786 
Fax: 617.253.4560 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Scenario creation, Scenario development, Scenario planning, Intuitive Logics 
  
                                                 
1
 Present contact information for Dr. Mahender Singh (now at Malaysia Institute for Supply Chain Innovation; 
msingh@misi.edu.my  ): 2A, Persiaran Tebar Layar, Seksyen U8, Bukit Jelutong, Shah Alam, 40150 Selangor, 
Malaysia 
 (2) 
Axiomatic foundation and a structured process for developing firm-
specific Intuitive Logics scenarios 
This paper presents an axiomatic foundation for developing firm-specific scenarios in the 
tradition of the Intuitive Logics School (ILS), a structured scenario creation process built on 
that foundation, and its application using a case study. The ILS outlines a high-level 
scenario-development process, but without a theoretical basis or prescriptions for executing 
different process steps. The lack of theoretical grounding has led to a proliferation of 
methods for developing scenarios, without any basis for comparing them. We fill this gap in 
the literature by articulating a set of axioms characterizing the nature of human knowledge 
about the business environment and scenarios as depictions of that environment. Using this 
theoretical foundation, we devise a structured process for developing scenarios. Finally, we 
demonstrate this process by applying it to develop four scenarios for a firm in the U.S. 
healthcare sector. 
Keywords: Scenario creation, Scenario development, Scenario planning, Intuitive Logics 
1 Introduction 
Scenario planning is a long-range planning process developed by practitioners [1], and used widely 
by government and corporate planners for over half a century [2] for formulating strategies (e.g., 
Refs. [3-7]) and making sense of ambiguous developments in the business environment [8, 9]. 
Scenario planning is not a singular method; rather, it is an umbrella term encompassing at least 
three schools of thought with different underlying philosophies guiding the creation and application 
of scenarios [2]. As many as 23 techniques for developing scenarios [10] and at least ten approaches 
to using scenarios [5, 11] have been identified. However, barring a few exceptions [12-14], most of 
the scenario methods “are poorly defined, have no theoretical justification [… and] are highly 
prescriptive in nature” [15]. Despite the “extraordinary challenge in intellectual and methodological 
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terms” in the practice of foresight, the “methodological accounts [, if available] are usually (very) 
short descriptions of some main steps or are confined to a simple scheme” [16, p. 11]. The lack of 
“theoretical and axiomatic underpinning of [scenario planning, compared to] other decision-analysis 
tools, such as decision analysis and statistical forecasting” is attributed to the fact that the method 
“has been developed largely by practitioners” [17, p.2]. This is not a mere academic inconvenience, 
but also a problem for practice as evidence from practice shows that scenario development is not a 
straightforward task and requires considerable skill [15]. Since scenario development processes are 
normative guides, decision theorists would argue that they should be “evaluated by their theoretical 
adequacy” [18, p.17]. A theoretical foundation could improve “methodological credibility” of the 
scenario development process and render the scenarios developed using the process more 
“trustworthy” [19]. Additionally, such theoretical grounding could also make it easier to evaluate 
and compare the numerous “highly personalized practices” [20]. 
The research presented in this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature. Our work 
addresses scenario development in the Intuitive Logics School (ILS), which is the most widely used 
scenario method [2, 5, 10]. The guidelines for developing ILS scenarios are provided in Peter 
Schwartz’s book [21], which is considered the primary reference for ILS [14]. The book does not 
provide a theoretical basis for developing scenarios, and discourages structured approaches for 
scenario creation arguing [21, p.30] “you cannot create scenarios from recipes.” Against this 
backdrop, the present work makes three specific contributions. First, we provide a theoretical 
foundation for scenario development in the form of a set of axioms. Second, we show that this basis 
can be used to discern a correct process for developing scenarios. We use the phrase “a correct 
process” to suggest the possibility of at least one incorrect and potentially multiple correct ways to 
develop scenarios – remaining consistent with the sentiment that “there is no one right way to 
design scenarios” [22, p. 67] (emphasis added). Our only additional contention is that there could be 
an incorrect way to design scenarios, where correctness is defined by conformity of the process to 
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the axioms. Third, we demonstrate the process by applying it to develop scenarios for a firm in the 
U.S. healthcare sector.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with an overview of the 
current state of the scenario planning literature: we present the generic ILS scenario development 
process [22], highlight the difficulties we encountered first-hand in applying the ILS process, which 
motivated this research, and summarize the key attempts at theorizing scenario creation (Section 2). 
Following this, we introduce our theoretical foundation for the scenario development process 
(Section 3). This consists of definitions of the terms used in the scenario creation process, and a set 
of axioms regarding the nature of employees’ and experts’ knowledge about the business 
environment and regarding attributes of the scenarios as depictions of this environment. Using these 
axioms, we prescribe a structured process for developing scenarios and demonstrate it by applying 
to a case (Section 4). Finally, we discuss the implications of this research for theory and practice, 
highlight its limitations, and suggest a few directions for the future research (Section 5). 
2 Scenario development in the Intuitive Logics School 
Scenario planning rests on the assumption that “events do not just happen at random, but they are 
related to each other through a structure where causes drive effects and one event leads to another” 
[23, p.105]. The Intuitive Logics School (ILS) scenarios are created in a set and embody this 
structure qualitatively. The scenarios in a set contain certain trends that remain identical in all 
scenarios and critical uncertainties that take different values in different scenarios. 
2.1 ILS scenario development process 
Schwartz [21] provides an eight-step process for creating and applying scenarios, which is 
considered the primary reference for the method [16] and “the best overall guide to process” [5, 
pp.81-2]. The first six steps describe the process of scenario development and are presented below. 
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The last two steps—identification of implications and indicators—describe scenario use, and are 
outside the scope of this paper. 
1. Identify focal issue or decision: A set of scenarios is developed to help an organization deal 
with a specific issue or decision. The first step is to explicitly state this focal issue or focal 
decision. The scenarios are custom-made for the organization to address this issue. 
2. Identify key factors in the local environment: Next, key factors affecting the issue are 
identified. Key factors are those elements, either internal to the organization or parts of the 
external environment, that influence the success of the focal decision.  
3. Identify driving forces: Driving forces are the “driving trends in the macro-environment that 
influence the key factors identified” in the previous step [21, p.227]. These are different 
aspects of five domains of the environment—Society, Technology, Economy, Environment, 
and Politics (abbreviated as STEEP)—that “move the plot of a scenario, that determine the 
story’s outcome” [21, p.107]. Once identified, driving forces are separated into two groups: 
certain trends and critical uncertainties. Trends are those elements whose outcome is 
inevitable and can be known fairly accurately over the study’s planning horizon. Critical 
uncertainties are the forces whose outcomes cannot be predicted over the planning horizon. 
4. Rank by importance and uncertainty: Next, the key factors and driving forces are ranked by 
two criteria: first by their importance for the success of the focal issue, and then by degree of 
uncertainty in their future state over the planning horizon. The goal is to identify [21, p.228] 
“two or three factors or trends that are most important and most uncertain” to form the 
scenario logic, which is chosen in the next step (emphasis in the original). 
5. Select scenario logic: Scenario logic is the set of “axes along which the eventual scenarios 
will differ” [21, p.229]. Schwartz informs that “determining these axes is among the most 
important steps in the entire scenario-generating [sic] process.” Typically, the ILS scenario 
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logic consists of two elements, and the combinations of their high and low values are used to 
seed four scenarios. This approach is “assumed to be a kind of standard method” [24, p.19]. 
6. Flesh out the scenarios: Finally, the values of the remaining key factors and driving forces 
are specified and all elements are elaborated in each scenario. These distinct elements are 
then weaved “together in the form of a narrative” [21, p.231], which describes the world in 
the scenario and explains how we transition from the present state to that world. 
2.2 Challenges experienced in practicing the ILS scenario development process 
We applied the scenario development process mentioned above in six cases: chemical 
manufacturing (2 cases), government agencies (2), pharmaceutical distribution (1), and retail (1). 
We encountered three types of challenges in these instances. 
2.2.1 Lack of systematic approach to develop scenarios 
The ILS scenario development process lists what steps to follow, but does not prescribe how each 
step in the process should be performed. This raised three specific questions in executing each 
process step in our scenario projects: 
 Who should execute each step, and what data sources should be used? 
 What methods should be used for gathering the necessary information? 
 What is the rationale for making the above choices? 
2.2.2 Imprecise definitions and inconsistent use of terms 
Scenario planning literature uses several terms – key factors, driving forces, etc. – to describe the 
business environment, but does not define them. Precise definitions of these terms are necessary as 
the scenario development process refers to different terms in different steps. In lieu of precise 
definitions in the seminal work [21], authors of the subsequent works (e.g., Refs. [22, 23]) have 
used various terms to illustrate the same aspects of the scenario creation process. For instance, van 
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der Heijden [23, p.226]—one of the most prolific scholars of scenario planning [25]—uses terms 
business factors and business variables interchangeably to refer to the “relatively obvious, relatively 
close-in issues that shape organizational success or failure”, which are called key factors and key 
local factors by Schwartz [21]. Van der Heijden uses term environmental factors to describe [23, 
p.226] “contextual variables related to environmental aspects driving business factors” or [p.114] 
“circumstances in the environment that could have a major impact on our business, but are 
essentially outside our own control.” Both these interpretations of the term seem to refer to macro 
factors that shape the business environment, but are outside the span of control for any single 
organization. This parallels Schwartz’s description of driving forces as the environmental variables, 
which “as individuals, or even as companies, we have little control over” [21, p.113]. Furthermore, 
Schwartz sometime uses terms driving forces and driving trends interchangeably, while also using 
the term trend to refer to predetermined elements of the environment, which are distinct from the 
other type of driving force: uncertainty.  
This semantic confusion has been noted by Bradfield, et al. [2, p.796] in their extensive 
review of the scenario planning literature: they note, “the literature reveals a large number of 
different and at times conflicting definitions.” Bishop, et al. [10, p.6] also criticize the scenario 
planning literature by pointing out that “even the most basic vocabulary is used every which way in 
this field”. While the essence of Schwartz’s message could be understood from a close reading of 
his book, the lack of a well-defined terminology made it difficult to communicate the process to the 
sponsors of our scenario studies. 
2.2.3 Difficulty of choosing axes of scenario logic 
Schwartz [21] notes that choosing scenario logic is “among the most important steps” in the entire 
scenario creation process. However, the literature does not provide a systematic method for 
performing this crucial task; rather, choice of the scenario logic seems to be a highly subjective 
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decision. While very little has been published about actual methods used for developing scenarios, 
one ethnographic study of scenario creation by professional futurists revealed that even these 
experienced futurists struggled to choose a scenario logic in the studied project. The study showed 
that the futurists could not agree on the choice of scenario axes after several rounds of discussion, 
and when two driving forces out of three competing candidates were chosen as the axes, some team 
members criticized the selection and expressed frustration that “the scenario axes were imposed on 
them without their consent” [24, p.21]! We have experienced difficulty in choosing scenario logics 
in several of our own scenario studies, and have no reason to believe that the findings in the above 
ethnography are exceptions.  
2.3 Extant attempts at theorizing scenario development 
The scenario planning literature has seen a few attempts of theorizing the scenario development 
process in recent years. Chermack [11, 26] is one of the first to provide a theoretical model. He calls 
his work “preliminary in nature” [26, p. 59] as it consists of a rather broad compilation of concepts 
and propositions linking them. MacKay and Tambeau [27] use structuration theory—which 
describes how social structures evolve through a reciprocal relationship between the agents and the 
structure that constraints agency—as a basis for developing scenarios. Their approach models 
interpretations of representative agents to predict how the system may evolve through the agents’ 
actions. However, predicting the effects of one’s actions on the entire social structure—and hence, 
the resulting scenarios—can be difficult to envision for boundedly rational scenario creators [28] 
since, as the authors admit themselves, the changes result “often through the unintended 
consequences of action” [p. 676] and uncertainty in the future results from “complexity of agency-
structure interactions” [p. 682] (emphasis added in both quotes). Sarpong [29] argues that scenario 
thinking could be theorized as a social practice, where memory of the past, perception of the 
present, and prediction of the future together enable making sense of the environment. Although 
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Sarpong’s framework falls far short of being labeled a theory, the temporal element of strategy-
making has recently been elucidated in a theoretical model of practice of strategy making [30]. Burt 
[31] provides a method for developing scenarios for a system by mapping its causal loops and 
showing how disruptive innovations could alter the business-as-usual in the system. This appears to 
be a useful process for developing scenarios; however, no theoretical foundation is provided for 
creating the system’s causal loop diagrams. Overall, scenario planning scholars have started 
proposing alternate theoretical models for the scenario development process. However, the literature 
still lacks a theoretical framework to guide scenario creation by a group of boundedly rational 
individuals with a limited knowledge of the system they are creating scenarios for. 
3 Scenario development: Theoretical foundation 
In this section, we address the first part of our research motivated by the challenges mentioned in 
the previous section. We provide a conceptual model of the business environment and define the 
terms used in scenario development (Section 3.1). Following this, we present a set of axioms as the 
theoretical basis for developing scenarios (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Terminology 
Scenario planning takes an open systems perspective on organizational strategy [9] treating 
organizations as interdependent on the environment. An organization’s environment is the set of 
“variables not subject to complete control by the organization and hence not contained within [its] 
closed system of logic” [32]. Environment is the “store of resources as well as a source of 
opportunities and constraints, demand and threats” [33] for the organization, and can affect the 
organization “through the process of making available or withholding resources” [34, p.61]. While 
organizations cannot eliminate their dependence on the environment, they “seek to place their 
boundaries around those activities which if left to the task environment would be crucial 
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contingencies” [32, p.39]. Although the leaders of an organization, by definition, cannot control any 
aspect of the environment, they do have some discretion to “select the types of environment in 
which they will operate [… and] may command sufficient power to influence the conditions 
prevailing within environments where they are already operating” (emphases added) [35]. An 
organization may manipulate the environmental variables by either bringing them under its control 
through mergers, vertical integration, etc. or managing its dependence on them through joint 
ventures, overlapping boards of directors, etc. [36], or through lobbying the governments. The part 
of the environment amenable to an organization’s influence is sometimes referred to as its 
transactional environment [37] where, as described by van der Heijden, “the organization is a 
significant player, influencing outcomes as much as being influenced by them” [23, p.115]. He calls 
the part of organization’s environment, “which has important repercussions for the organization but 
in which it has little or no influence” its contextual environment. Thus, an organization’s ability to 
control and influence helps distinguish different parts of the environment. The idea that an 
organization may not have the ability to shape evolution of its environment is also reflected in the 
term “policy-free” scenarios, which is used to indicate that the developed scenarios are “upshots of 
interplay between various driving forces in which it is assumed that the client of the foresight would 
not act” [16, p. 43]. This characterization of the relationship between organization and environment 
provides the basis for defining the key terms used in the scenario development process. The terms 
are defined below; their definitions are also presented in the form of a flowchart in Fig. 1. 
 Focal decision: A decision about organizational action or structure (thus, amenable to the 
organization’s control) to be made using the scenarios being developed. 
 Local factor: An element of the organization’s external environment (thus, not amenable to 
the organization’s control), which the organization can influence. 
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 Driving force: An element of the organization’s external environment (thus, not amenable to 
the organization’s control), which the organization cannot influence. Driving forces are 
further classified into two types for creating scenarios: 
o Trend: The driving force whose value over the planning horizon can be predicted 
with reasonable accuracy. 
o Uncertainty: The driving force whose value over the planning horizon cannot be 
predicted with reasonable accuracy.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
The above terms are schematically presented in Fig. 2. The variables related to the focal decision 
are contained in a black box. This black box encompasses the internal variables that the 
organization has full control over and wants to define by making the focal decision. The focal 
decision in the box is surrounded primarily – but not necessarily entirely – by local factors, which 
occupy the gray area inside the inner circle with a dashed circumference. The local factors are 
surrounded by driving forces, which occupy the dotted area inside the outer circle with a solid 
circumference. The area between the box and the smaller inner circle with a dashed circumference 
is the transactional environment; the area between the inner circle and the outer circle with a thick 
circumference is the contextual environment. Local factors lie in the organization’s transactional 
environment, and the organization’s contextual environment contains the driving forces. Note that 
our definitions leave open the possibility that some driving forces may lie in the organization’s 
transactional environment (which will occupy the dotted area between the black box and the inner 
circle with a dashed circumference). The rationale behind this is that an organization is likely to 
have some way to influence most of the aspects of its transactional environment, but may also have 
some aspects in the transactional environment that it has no ability to influence. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
3.1.1 Example of focal decision, local factors, and driving forces 
An example of a focal decision is a firm’s manufacturing strategy for a particular product line. The 
components of the focal decision include internal elements the organization has to specify, such as 
whether to make or buy each product, production technology (or vendors) to use, production 
capacity needed, location(s) of manufacturing facilities (or vendors), etc. These elements are 
affected by local factors such as demand for the product, variation in demand over time, reliability 
of raw material and component supplies, etc. The firm does not control these factors, but can 
influence them. For example, demand can be influenced through advertising and pricing; seasonal 
variation in demand can be influenced through sales promotions; reliability of supply can be 
influenced by in-sourcing or creating long-term contracts with suppliers; and so on. The local 
factors are affected by driving forces, such as environmental consciousness of society, business tax 
policies, trade regulations, advances in information technology, etc. These are the macro forces that 
the firm cannot influence. They generally affect the firm indirectly by influencing the local factors. 
For instance, “Population of 20-64 year old adults” may influence the demand for the firm’s 
product; “Price of crude oil” may influence product demand and the firm’s transportation cost; 
“Trade regulations” may affect access to foreign suppliers, the cost of supplies, and the reliability of 
supply; and so on. Among these examples, the “Population of 20-64 year old adults” can be 
predicted fairly accurately for a planning horizon of five-years; therefore, it is a trend. On the other 
hand, the “Price of crude oil” may not be predicted reasonably accurately over the same period; 
therefore, it is an uncertainty. 
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3.2 Axiomatic foundation for the scenario development process 
This section articulates the axioms about the knowledge of local factors and driving forces of the 
individuals involved in the scenario creation process. The knowledge perspective is important, to 
the point of codifying it in a set of axioms, in the scenario creation process because “environments 
have multiple dimensions […] and these dimensions are not given characteristics of the field but 
rather constructed through interpretations of the actors who make up the field” [38, p.687]. Creating 
scenarios involves marshalling the disparate chunks of relevant knowledge from multiple 
individuals to build visions of plausible future to tackle the focal issue. The following axioms state 
where this relevant knowledge may be located. While some may seem more obvious than the 
others, each axiom is accompanied by a brief justification from the extant literature. 
Commitment and support from the top leader(s) is necessary for the success of any major 
project in an organization. Schoemaker [39] lists “failing to gain top management support early on” 
as the first in his list of twenty pitfalls that can derail a scenario project. Involvement of the leader 
from the beginning ensures that the focal issue chosen for the scenario project is an appropriate 
strategic issue for the organization to pursue. This is especially important as scenario planning 
projects require commitment of time from senior managers, and may not show immediate, tangible 
benefits. A leader is also in a position to assemble an appropriate group of people from the 
organization to participate in the project. Therefore, 
Axiom 1: It is necessary that the scope of a scenario project is defined by the leader of 
the organization responsible for the focal issue for the project to succeed. 
Human knowledge of the business environment is a key ingredient of the scenarios. It has been 
acknowledged that the knowledge relevant for making a complex decision—such as, formulating an 
organization’s strategy—is distributed among several individuals [40, 41], and could possibly not 
be acquired by a single person [42]. The omniscient individual may not exist as humans are only 
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boundedly rational [28]. Human attention is a scarce resource, and employees of an organization 
allocate their attention to a limited number of internal and external elements [43]. The elements 
attended by each individual depend on the person’s professional background [44, 45] and role 
within the organization [46]. The allocation of attention is “not uniform throughout the 
[organization but] differentiated according to the division of labor inherent in the firm’s rules, 
positions, players, and resources” [43, p.199]. Empirical evidence supports these arguments, 
showing “striking differences in the form and richness of the taxonomic mental models held by 
managers both within and between companies [… where] the diversity seems to reflect differences 
in the roles particular actors perform within their organizations” [47, p.533]. As a result, 
“knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use […exists] solely as the dispersed bits 
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess” 
[40, p. 519]. Tsoukas expounds the implication of this for strategic planning: “in order for corporate 
planners to formulate a strategy, they would need, among other things, to be in possession of 
knowledge which is, to a large extent, fundamentally dispersed”. The next axiom flows from this. 
Axiom 2: An individual member of an organization is knowledgeable about only a subset 
of the elements in organization’s environment. Furthermore, different individuals in the 
same organization are knowledgeable about different parts of the environment. 
While the relevant knowledge is dispersed among several individuals, what each individual knows 
also depends on how the person applies his/her knowledge. Psychologist Diane Halpern [48, p. 26] 
talks of an old saying in psychology that “the head remembers what it does.” The information that is 
most frequently retrieved and used by the mind becomes most readily available. This is why 
specialization in particular area of knowledge is recommended for improving “efficiency in 
knowledge production”, i.e. acquiring, storing, and creating knowledge [49, p. 112]. Individuals are 
more knowledgeable about “the particular circumstances of time and place” relevant to their routine 
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decisions than external experts [40]. In making operational and tactical decisions, individual 
employees have to account for different elements in the organization’s transactional environment 
that influence those decisions. Because of their routine interactions with it, the organization’s 
employees (particularly, middle and senior managers) are likely to have a more nuanced 
understanding of the transactional environment, and hence the local factors, compared to an external 
expert. 
Axiom 3: Compared to external experts, middle and senior managers in an organization 
are more knowledgeable about the local factors in their organization’s environment. 
While local factors are known to the organizational managers, driving forces “are less obvious, and 
often remain off [their] radar” [23, p. 227]. Driving forces, however, have been identified by 
scenario practitioners from individuals in the organization using techniques such as influence 
diagrams or asking ‘why’ repeatedly. The process of soliciting driving forces from organizational 
individuals—either using deliberate methods or through voluntary introspection by individuals—is 
typically inside-out: it starts from the knowledge of organization’s local factors and extends outside 
to identify driving forces that may influence those factors. Alternatively, driving forces can also be 
found from external experts and market research databases. Such external sources provide 
information about the general macro-level environment; not all of the macro-level driving forces 
identified by these sources may be relevant to the organization or its industry. The collection of 
driving forces identified from the external experts, thus, provides an outside-in perspective. The 
driving forces obtained from experts will also depend on the collection of experts consulted. There 
is no guarantee that the collection of driving forces obtained from external experts will 
comprehensively include those identified through the inside-out search from the organizational 
personnel, or vice versa. Thus, 
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Axiom 4: Neither a collection of external experts nor a diverse group of personnel from 
the organization can be guaranteed to know of all the driving forces the other group is 
aware of. 
Local factors are in the immediate vicinity of the organization and have a direct impact on it. On the 
other hand, most of the driving forces are separated from the organization and affect the 
organization only through the local factors. Managers are known to spend more time on the issues 
in the transactional environment, which consists primarily of local factors, and less on the 
contextual environment, which is primarily comprised of driving forces [8]. Thus, it is easier for an 
individual from the organization to envision the impact of a local factor, compared to that of a 
driving force, on the focal decision. 
Axiom 5: It is easier for the member of an organization to understand how a local factor, 
as opposed to a driving force, affects the focal decision. 
Individual members of an organization, compared to external experts, also have a better 
understanding of their organization’s internal elements. The ongoing process of sensemaking [50, 
51] gives the individuals ample opportunities to understand how changes in various aspects of the 
local environment affect their organization. Therefore, the individual members of the organization, 
especially middle and senior managers, are likely to have a better understanding of how a local 
factor affects the focal decision than external experts. So, while Axiom 3 states that the managers 
know better than external experts which local factors affect the focal decision, Axiom 6 states that 
the managers are better informed about what effect any given local factor has on the focal decision. 
Thus, Axiom 3 states that organizational members will identify more local factors than external 
experts; Axiom 6 states that the organizational members will be more accurate judges of impact of 
local factors on focal decision. 
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Axiom 6: Compared to an external expert, individual members of the organization have 
more accurate knowledge of the effect of a local factor on the focal decision. 
Identifying the relationship between driving forces and local factors involves answering the 
question, such as “does driving force X affect local factor Y?” To answer this question well, one 
needs to have a good understanding of the respective driving forces and local factors. The middle 
and senior managers of an organization dealing with the focal decision are familiar with the local 
factors. While they may not be knowledgeable of all the relevant driving forces, the middle and 
senior managers are also experienced enough to judge, individually, whether a given set of driving 
forces can affect the local factors in their environment. Thus, the individual middle and senior 
managers of an organization can be assumed to be capable of correctly stating whether a driving 
force affects a local factor. 
Axiom 7: Individual middle and senior managers in an organization can correctly state 
whether a particular driving force influences the magnitude and/or direction of a 
particular local factor in the organization’s environment. 
Scenarios are pictures of the external environment, which can be described in terms of either 
driving forces, local factors, or both. Driving forces are outside an organization’s scope of influence 
and need to be accommodated in the organization’s strategy. Therefore, they are ideal candidates 
for developing scenarios. On the other hand, an organization has the ability to influence the local 
factors in its environment. Stipulating specific values of local factors in a scenario rules out the 
decision-makers’ ability to identify strategies to influence them. Therefore, local factors should not 
be mentioned in the description of a scenario. 
Axiom 8: Scenarios should be described using driving forces only; they should not 
specify values for the local factors. 
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For a scenario to be useful, decision-makers have to believe that their organization could encounter 
the world described in the scenario in future. Believability is achieved when each scenario is 
internally consistent and plausible [23, 52] in the eyes of scenario users. One of the common pitfalls 
of the scenario creation process is the failure to tell a dynamic story narrating how we “get from 
today to the future world projected in the end-state description” [39, p. 429]. This is why scenario 
scholars recommend that scenarios be described such that they “grow logically from the past and 
the present and reflect current knowledge” [23, p. 225]. Scenarios do not need to be projections of 
trends believed to highly likely to grow from the past and the present; they could also be “peripheral 
scenarios” [53] that occur when driving forces take values that have low probability, but are 
plausible. Ducot & Lubben [53, p. 54] describe these scenarios as following “a line near the surface 
of the cone of possibilities” connecting the present to the future scenario. 
Axiom 9: For it to be judged plausible, a scenario should (i) be internally consistent and 
(ii) describe how the world transitions from today to that scenario using the 
socioeconomic and technical artifacts present today, which are not disputed by the 
organization’s members involved in creating and using the scenarios. 
4 Results: Scenario development process and its application 
The guidelines for creating a structured approach for developing scenarios based on the axioms 
presented above are summarized in Table 1. Using these guidelines, we created a scenario 
development process for the Intuitive Logics School. This section presents the structured process 
and then illustrates it by applying to a case. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
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4.1 Scenario development process 
4.1.1 Step 1: Define scope of the scenario planning project 
The leader of the organization whose focal question is to be answered should define the project 
scope and select the project team (Axiom 1). Defining the scope of a scenario planning project 
consists of specifying three variables: stating the focal decision to be made using the scenarios, 
delineating the part of the organization about which long-range planning decisions could be made, 
and specifying the time horizon to be considered in the study. Once the project scope is defined, a 
project team should be selected. The members of this project team are the sources of the data used 
for developing scenarios. The team should have representatives from all the functional areas in the 
organization that are included in the project scope, as well as the functions that are highly related to 
those within the scope (Axiom 2). The members of the team need to be knowledgeable about the 
function and have the authority to implement any changes in the function resulting from the project.  
4.1.2 Step 2: Identify key factors in the local environment 
Organizational members are more knowledgeable about the local factors relevant to the focal 
decision than external experts, and hence are the source of this information (Axiom 3). These 
individuals are identified by the organizational leader sponsoring the scenario project in Step 1. 
Obtaining local factors from the team members is a process of knowledge elicitation, where the 
researcher obtaining the information has to take a systematic approach that can extract each team 
member’s relevant knowledge as completely as possible and without adulterating the team 
member’s knowledge with the researcher’s own thoughts. Taking the following two steps ensures 
that both these goals are met: 
 Inform the team-members in advance what type of information is expected from them. This 
requires that the team members are aware of the goal and scope of the project, and familiar 
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with the definitions of terms, such as ‘business environment’, ‘local factors’, etc., used in the 
process. 
 Use an exploratory – as opposed to a confirmatory – approach for obtaining the information 
[54]. The explanatory approach assumes that the researcher does not know of all the 
concepts considered relevant for the focal issue by the project team member (Axiom 3), and 
hence relies on the use of open-ended questions. 
The researcher may use generic knowledge elicitation methods such as semi-structured interviews 
[55] or brainstorming [56], or employ specialized techniques such as interactively elicited 
knowledge maps [57], verbal protocol analysis [58], text-based causal mapping [59], etc. Various 
knowledge elicitation techniques have been evaluated by organizational researchers [59-62], and are 
not covered in this paper. 
4.1.3 Step 3: Identify and assess driving forces 
This step involves identifying driving forces that may affect the organization and assessing whether 
their value over the planning horizon is predictable (“trend”) or not (“uncertainty”). Since neither a 
collection of external experts nor a group of individuals in the organization alone can be guaranteed 
to have a comprehensive knowledge of the driving forces that may be relevant for a scenario study 
(Axiom 4), both external experts and project team members should be used as the sources of driving 
forces for the study. Information about driving forces is obtained from external experts using 
interviews, via documents authored by them, or through industry research reports. Information 
related to driving forces can be elicited from the project team member in the same session as the 
one used for obtaining local factors.  
Once a list of driving forces is compiled, the predictability of each force over the planning 
horizon is evaluated. Van der Heijden warns that “deciding the boundary line between the 
predictable and the uncertain is not a trivial matter” [9]. One way to do this is to list the different 
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values of each driving force predicted by the interviewees and in the industry research reports, and 
then deduce the level of uncertainty about the driving force from the diversity of opinions of 
different informed experts. The uncertainty is described qualitatively, and could be either “High”, 
“Medium”, or “Low” (trend). When in doubt about the appropriate level of uncertainty for a driving 
force, assume a higher level of uncertainty.  
4.1.4 Step 4: Rank by importance and uncertainty 
This step involves ranking the key factors and driving forces – by their impact on the focal decision 
and uncertainty over the planning horizon – for choosing the scenario logic. Scenarios need to be 
described only in terms of driving forces (Axiom 8). Therefore, the desired output of Step 4 is the 
ranking of driving forces by impact and uncertainty. The uncertainty of each driving force has 
already been evaluated in Step 3; one method for calculating impact is described below. 
 Compared to an external expert, the members of the project team are better informed about 
the effect of an element of the environment on the focal decision (Axiom 6). However, the team 
members are more likely to have a better idea of how a local factor—not a driving force—affects 
the focal decision (Axiom 5). Therefore, the first step in evaluating the impact of a driving force is 
to ask the project team members to assess the impact of a local factor on the focal decision. This 
assessment can be completed using a structured questionnaire; the impact can be evaluated on a 5- 
or 7-point scale. The absolute value of impact is more important than the direction of impact. 
Therefore, the two extreme values of the scale used for reporting impact could be: “No impact” and 
“Extremely strong impact”. Ideally, impact of all local factors identified in Step 2 should be 
assessed. To ensure that all respondents have a uniform understanding of the local factors listed in 
the questionnaire, the factors should be worded by following the guidelines for writing good survey 
questions (e.g., Ref. [63]), such as, using terms that are uniformly understood by the respondents, 
providing definitions where necessary, not asking multi-barrel questions, etc. The questionnaires 
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should be completed individually by project team members. The impact of each local factor is the 
average of the evaluations of all team members. Local factors whose assessed impact is highly 
variable should be explored further, as they may not have been understood well by the project team 
members. 
The next step is to use the impact of local factors to calculate the impact of driving forces. 
For this, we first need to establish whether a driving force influences a local factor. This is done by 
the project team members (Axiom 7), by denoting whether a driving force affects a local factor. If 
the exercise has n driving forces and m local factors, the team members need to evaluate 𝑛 ∗ 𝑚 
relationships. The number of evaluations can be kept to a manageable number by choosing only a 
subset of local factors—key local factors—for the mapping exercise. The factors chosen as key 
local factors should represents all important domains relevant to the focal decision, with the factors 
having the highest impact within each domain being selected. 
The mapping between driving forces and key local factors is accomplished using a 
structured questionnaire asking questions of nature “Does <Driving force> influence <Key local 
factor>?” (binary answers: Yes/No), or “How strongly does <Driving force> influence <Key local 
factor>?” (with at least three choices: “No effect”, “Weak effect”, and “Strong effect”). The 
relationship is presented numerically on a 0-1 scale. The questionnaire should be completed by each 
team member individually; the strength of the relationship between a driving force and a local factor 
is the average of all assessments. The impact of a driving force is calculated as follows: 
(
Impact of key 
driving force F
) = ∑ (
Impact of key 
local factor 𝑖
) ∗ (
Strngth of relationship between 
local factor 𝑖 and driving force F
)
𝑖∈{all key local factors}
  
The key local factors cease to play a role in the scenario creation process once their 
mapping with the driving forces is complete, as the scenarios are defined using driving forces only 
(per Axiom 8). However, our experience suggests that local factors are useful during scenario 
application to understand the implications of driving forces in more tangible terms. 
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4.1.5 Step 5: Select scenario logic 
The typical scenario logic in the ILS consists of two environmental elements; combinations of the 
two extreme values of the two provide four scenario seeds. Since the scenarios are described using 
driving forces only (Axiom 8), the scenario logic will consists of the driving forces that have the 
greatest impact on the focal decision (determined in Step 4), have high or medium level of 
uncertainty (determined in Step 3), and are not highly correlated. Two driving forces are considered 
to be highly correlated if they have similar influence on the key local factors. The purpose of 
choosing driving forces with low correlations to define the scenario logic is to ensure that the 
resulting scenarios are diverse in terms of their impact on the organization’s transactional 
environment. Correlations between all driving forces are calculated using the strength of the driving 
force’s relationship with the key local factors. 
Armed with the information about (a) impact and (b) uncertainty of each driving force, and 
(c) correlations between all pairs of driving forces, the project facilitators are ready to choose 
driving forces to form the scenario logic. Project team members should be involved in choosing the 
scenario logic, so that they accept the logic and the scenarios developed subsequently. Choosing 
scenario logic is not an exact science, and multiple candidate scenario logics should be evaluated 
before settling with one. To begin, two driving forces with (a) high impact (not necessarily, the 
highest), (b) medium or high level of uncertainty, and (c) low correlation between them should be 
selected as the first candidate scenario logic. The resulting four scenario seeds should be discussed 
with the project team to evaluate if they could lead to four very different and interesting scenarios. 
This process should be repeated with a few more scenario logics consisting of two driving forces 
chosen as mentioned above. Our experience suggests that generally two to four candidate scenario 
logics could be evaluated before selecting one to create scenarios for that project. 
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4.1.6 Step 6: Flesh out the scenarios  
The last step in the scenario creation process involves specifying values of all driving forces, in 
addition to the two selected as part of the scenario logic. First, the values of all driving force 
identified as trends are specified; each trend takes the same value—it’s expected value over the 
planning horizon—in every scenario. Next, the values of all remaining driving forces are assigned, 
starting with the force with the most impact and continuing in the descending order. The value of 
each driving force in each scenario is specified so that it is consistent with the values taken by other 
driving forces already specified in the scenario. This ensures that the scenario is internally 
consistent. Also, for each pair of highly correlated driving forces, an attempt should be made to 
create all four combinations of their high and low values in the four scenarios as much as possible.  
The structures for all scenarios should be validated for plausibility and internal consistency 
by the project team. The information gathered during industry research is useful to inform how the 
proposed combination of driving forces suggested in the scenario structure could come about. Once 
the structures are validated, narratives are developed for each scenario. The narratives should 
describe the scenario vividly and also mention how the world can transition from today to the world 
described in the scenario using the artifacts that exist today. This helps improve the plausibility of 
the scenario in the minds of its users (Axiom 9). It may be necessary to conduct additional industry 
research when developing narratives, to find specific examples of technologies, political 
developments, etc. present today that can be used to show how a driving force can take a specific 
value in each scenario. A professional story-writer could be hired to develop the narratives; 
however, scenario structures and the material for writing the narratives should be provided by the 
project team. 
The last step in the scenario creation process is to assign a vivid name to each scenario [21, 
22, 23]. Capturing the essence of a scenario in a title makes the story easy to remember and 
reference in the strategy discussions [52]. Brainstorming with the project team is effective for 
 (25) 
generating ideas for the names. Before brainstorming, each team member should have read the 
scenario. The names each person proposes provides some idea about how s/he understands the 
world described in the scenario. The final name should be chosen by the project team. Our 
experience suggests that a project team may change the scenario names as the members become 
more familiar with the scenario. 
4.2 Application of scenario creation process: Medford 
Medford is a distributor of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies in the U.S. A scenario planning 
exercise was conducted with the pharmaceutical distribution business of the firm in 2010-11. 
Medford was (and still is) operating in a highly complex business environment shaped by a variety 
of driving forces, with the future of many being highly uncertain over the five year planning horizon 
of the study. For instance, the U.S. economy was weak and its recovery was hard to predict. The 
nature of the regulatory environment in the U.S. healthcare sector was uncertain: the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act had been challenged in courts, it was not clear if most U.S. 
states would enact pedigree regulations and if they would be different from the two state regulations 
already slated to come in effect (Florida and California). The nature of pharmaceuticals was 
changing: the proportion of branded drugs was certain to reduce, and the growth in biologic drugs 
was uncertain. All these driving forces would shape the local factors in Medford’s environment 
depending on how they evolved, and the supply chain assets needed for different environments 
could be different. For this reason, Medford decided to use scenario planning to gain some clarity 
over how the firm should think about its supply chain strategy. 
4.2.1 Step 1: Define scope of the scenario planning project 
The scope of the project was defined with the Senior Vice President of Medford’s pharmaceutical 
distribution supply chain, who sponsored the project, in a face to face meeting with the first and the 
third authors of the paper. The scope of the project was limited to on the pharmaceutical distribution 
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business of the firm in the U.S. The focal question for the scenario planning project was: what 
supply chain strategy should Medford adopt for pharmaceutical distribution to support the business 
over next five years. The project sponsor identified a diverse group of 25 mid- and senior-level 
managers to participate in the project. These managers came from 11 different functions (including 
Operations, Inventory Management, Strategic Planning, Account Management, Procurement, 
Information Technology, Human Resources, Health Environment & Safety, etc.) and from four 
hierarchical levels (mostly Vice Presidents) in Medford. In summary, five variables related to the 
scenario projects were specified: 
 Focal decision: Supply chain strategy 
 Business and market to focus: Pharmaceutical distribution in the United States 
 Functional areas to include: 11 functions (Operations, Procurement, Transportation, 
Account Management, IT, Quality/Regulatory, Strategic Planning, Human Resources, etc.) 
 Planning horizon: Five years 
 Project team members: 25 mid- and senior-level managers from 11 functional areas 
4.2.2 Step 2: Identify key factors in the local environment 
Local factors were identified using qualitative interviews with the 25 project team members. All 
interviews were conducted by the first author over phone and recorded with explicit consent of each 
respondent. Each team member was informed of the nature of the interview one day in advance. To 
identify relevant environmental elements, each team member was asked to “describe the business 
environment in which Medford would operate five years into the future”. The interviewer listened 
to the conversation carefully, noted down all the “markers” [55] in the information provided by the 
respondent. The interviewer asked follow-on questions using the markers; no probes were used. The 
interview continued until the respondent mentioned that s/he had nothing more to add. On average 
interviews lasted for one hour. Qualitative coding [64, 65] of the recorded interviews, also 
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conducted by the first author, yielded 55 features of the business environment. Of these, 37 were 
identified as local factors; the remaining 18 described aspects of different driving forces. 
4.2.3 Step 3: Identify and assess driving forces 
Driving forces were gathered through interviews with the project team members (internal source) as 
described above, and IBISWorld industry research databases [66] and additional desk research 
(external source), also conducted by the first author. In 2010, IBISWorld published reports for 681 
industries classified by 5-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. 15 
of these industries were deemed relevant to the pharmaceutical distribution supply chain. They 
included branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturing (NAICS: 32541a, b), drug wholesaling 
(42221), pharmacies and drug stores (44611), life and health insurance (52411a, b), health & 
welfare funds (52512), primary care and specialist doctors (62111a, b), home care providers 
(62161), general and specialty hospitals (62211, 62231), nursing care facilities (62311), retirement 
communities (62331) and biotechnology (NN001). 
Each IBISWorld industry report lists the Key External Drivers for the industry. The key 
external drivers from 15 industries were compiled to produce a list of 47 unique drivers. 
Coincidently, the interviews with the project team members also yielded 47 different aspects of 
driving forces. While the exact number of drivers from each source is not important, the numbers 
show that both sources were equally important in identifying drivers. The key drivers from the 
IBISWorld reports and those provided by the project team members were compiled into a single 
database. Similar drivers were grouped together and identified as aspects of a larger driving force. 
The grouping was first performed by the first and the third author, and then reviewed by the project 
team. In all, this exercise produced a list of 16 unique driving forces that shape Medford’s external 
environment. Using the IBISWorld predictions of various drivers grouped under one driving force 
and from interviews with the Medford team members, each driving force was judged to be either a 
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trend (predictable over 5-year planning horizon) or an uncertainty (not predictable over the planning 
horizon). This divided 16 driving forces into 14 uncertainties and 2 trends (presented in Table 2). 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
4.2.4 Step 4: Rank by importance and uncertainty 
First, impact of local factors on the focal decision was evaluated using a questionnaire, where each 
item was described as taking a particular value (e.g. “Customers will choose distributor based only 
on price”, “Pharmacies will bypass distributors and buy directly from manufacturers”, etc.). The 
team members rated the impact of each on a 5-point scale. 20 team members completed the paper-
based questionnaires at a workshop; five members joined remotely via telephone and completed the 
questionnaires using an online survey tool. However, some of the team members working remotely 
did not hear instructions for completing the survey due to connection difficulties in the conference. 
Therefore, all five remotely completed questionnaires were omitted from the analysis. 
A similar approach was taken to evaluate the uncertainty of each driving force. The team 
members assessed the uncertainty of each key local factor, which was then extrapolated to the 
driving force. Team members evaluated the impact of each local factor before evaluating its 
uncertainty. The questionnaire evaluations provide two types of uncertainty regarding the future 
state of a local factor: uncertainty perceived by an individual respondent and expressed in his/her 
evaluation, and uncertainty within the group as expressed in the spread of evaluations. A metric that 
combined both these uncertainties into one, coefficient of variation (COV), was used. 
The purpose of computing the impact and uncertainty of local factors is to transfer those 
values to driving forces by establishing a relationship between driving forces and local factors. To 
reduce the workload on the project team members, the subsequent analysis was conducted using a 
subset of local factors that had the most impact on the focal decision and were most uncertain over 
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the five-year planning horizon. Fig. 3 shows the impact and uncertainty values of all factors 
surveyed. 13 of these factors (enclosed in the circle in the figure) stand out as being most impactful 
as well as most uncertain. These are the key local factors affecting Medford’s supply chain strategy. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Strength of the relationship between key local factors and driving forces was evaluated by Medford 
project team members by answering a series of questions, with “Yes” or “No” answers, of form: 
“Does driving force DF affect key local factor KLF?” To prevent the biases of individual members 
from affecting the matches, more than one team member was asked to answer the above question 
for every driving force – key local factor (DF-KLF) pair. Having each team member evaluate every 
DF-KLF pair would have meant completing 182 evaluations (14 driving forces x 13 key local 
factors) by each person. To minimize the demand on these executives’ time, we assigned six 
randomly chosen driving forces to each team member, who then evaluated their relationship with all 
13 key local factors. Thus, each member answered the above question 78 times (6 driving forces x 
13 key local factors). As a result, each of the 14 driving forces was evaluated, for its relationship 
with the 13 key local factors, by at least five and up to eight members of the project team. The 
strength of each DF-KLF relationship is the proportion of members evaluating the relationship who 
judged the driving force to affect the factor. 
Table 3 presents the result of this analysis. The first two columns list the 14 uncertain 
driving forces and the number of respondents evaluating their relationship with key local factors. 
The factors are listed in the top row in the next 13 columns; impact and uncertainty of each is listed 
in the two rows below. The value (in range [0, 1]) in a cell shows the strength of the relationship 
between the driving force and key local factor in the corresponding row and column, respectively. 
The impact (uncertainty) of each driving forces is calculated by adding the products of the strength 
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of its relationship with each key local factors and the impact (uncertainty) of the latter. The last two 
columns show the impact and uncertainty of each driving force. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
4.2.5 Step 5: Select scenario logic 
Instead of blindly choosing the two most impactful and uncertain forces, five uncertainties with the 
most impact were short-listed, and different pair combinations were evaluated as potential scenario 
logics. In each case, team members gave a brief description of the four scenarios created by taking 
combinations of high and low values of the two scenario axes. The project team considered four 
such pairs and decided that the following two driving forces had the best potential to generate four 
scenarios that were most different from each other and could provide interesting insights:  
 Complexity of U.S. healthcare supply chain 
 Health of the overall U.S. economy.  
The combinations of the high and low values of these drivers provide four scenario seeds. 
4.2.6 Step 6: Flesh out the scenarios  
Of Medford’s 16 driving forces, two were classified as trends and 14 as uncertainties over the 
planning horizon of the scenario study. Each trend takes the same value in each of the four 
scenarios. For each uncertain driving force, two plausible extreme values are specified, with each 
value being assigned to the force in at least one scenario. Initially, the two extreme values are 
defined only broadly and qualitatively, and elaborated when writing scenarios. Based on the 
industry research, the high and low values for each uncertainty and the two trends were specified as 
shown in Table 4. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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----------------------------------------------- 
This scenario structure specifies the values of only two driving forces in each scenario. Next, values 
of the remaining driving forces are described in each scenario. Two additional criteria were used 
when prescribing the values taken by each uncertain driving force in every scenario: internal 
consistency and variation among highly-correlated driving force pairs: 
 Internal consistency: High or low value of each uncertain driving force was assigned to 
each scenario by judging which value would be consistent with the already specified driving 
forces in the scenario. After values of all driving forces were specified in each scenario, the 
complete structure was validated by the Medford project team members for internal 
consistency to correct any judgmental errors in the initial assignment. 
 Variation among highly-correlated driving force pairs: This criterion, not specified in the 
scenario planning literature, was deliberately used to generate cross-scenario variation in 
highly-correlated driving forces. For such pairs of driving forces, an attempt was made to 
assign each of the four high-low value combinations to one of the four scenarios. Pearson’s 
correlation was calculated for every pair of driving forces using the strength of association 
between a driving force and the vector of local factors (values shown in Table 5). 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Starting with the highest correlation (0.92, between “Consolidation within healthcare sector” and 
“Cost pressure in the healthcare sector”), each of the four combinations of the correlated pairs – 
(high, high), (high low), (low, high), (low low) – was assigned to one of the four scenarios, while 
maintaining internal consistency of the scenarios. It was possible to create all four combinations of 
the six pairs of highly-correlated driving forces: DF5 and DF6 (correlation=0.92), DF3 and DF14 
(0.71), DF3 and DF9 (0.67), DF8 and DF9 (0.63), DF1 and DF6 (0.61), and DF12 and DF14 (0.58). 
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It was not always possible to create such combinations for highly-correlated driving forces because 
of the violation of internal consistency, such as in case of DF5 and DF7 (0.70), DF4 and DF12 
(0.69), DF10 and DF12 (0.68), and DF13 and DF14 (0.60). 
The initial scenario structure developed using this procedure above was validated by the 
project team members. The team members were asked to check the scenario structure for two types 
of issues: implausibility of values taken by driving forces and violation of internal consistency 
within a scenario. The project team identified issues in all four scenarios. In some instances, 
information from industry research was available to argue in favor of the initial scenario structure, 
despite the team’s objection(s). In those cases, the team was informed how the proposed scenario 
structure could come about, using the factual information obtained from industry research. In all 
such cases, the team members agreed with the plausibility and/or internal consistency of the 
scenario structure upon seeing this additional information. If no information from industry research 
existed to resolve the conflict, necessary changes were made to the scenario structure as 
recommended by the team. Table 6 shows the final scenario structure. The cells with bold text are 
the ones where the team had asked to change the value in the initial structure, but later agreed to 
keep the original value based on the additional information. The cells with bold and italicized text 
are where the value of the driving force was changed per the team’s recommendation. The 
remaining cells are the ones whose value was not disputed.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Updating the scenario structure based on the project team’s feedback had two notable effects. One, 
some of the deliberate variations in four out of six pairs of highly correlated driving forces created 
across the four scenarios were lost. In the final scenario structure, the pair DF3-DF14 had only two 
variations across the four scenarios; three other pairs—DF3-DF9, DF8-DF9, and DF12-DF14—was 
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left with three out of four possible variations across the four scenarios. Two, the driving force 
“Overall focus on drug security and safety” (DF11) changed from being an uncertainty to a trend, as 
all four teams strongly argued that over the five-year planning horizon, the “Overall focus on drug 
security and safety” in the socio-political environment could be only “High”.  
After finalizing the scenario structure, scenario stories were written. For this, additional 
industry research was conducted. This research, however, was different from the one conducted at 
the beginning of the project. This research sought to find specific examples to argue how a driving 
force can take a specific value in each scenario. This was done to improve plausibility of the 
scenarios (per Axiom 9). Since each uncertain driving force takes two extreme values, it is 
necessary to find evidence to support how the driving force could evolve, from its present state, in 
either direction. For example, driving force “Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments” (DF3) 
takes value “temperature-sensitive drugs” in scenarios 2 and 3; and value “temperature-insensitive 
drugs” in scenarios 1 and 4. Given below is an example how “climate-sensitivity of drugs and 
treatments” in year 2016 was described in the scenarios: 
Description in scenarios 2 and 3:  
“Combined with advances in the related fields, such as genetics and computational biology, 
biotechnology has produced a vast array of biopharmaceuticals that target the underlying 
causes—not mere symptoms—of many serious diseases. The fruits of mapping of the human 
genome have begun paying off in the form of gene therapy products. These biologic products 
contain living organisms and need to be maintained in controlled climate from the time they are 
manufactured toll they are introduced into a patient’s body.” 
Description in scenarios 1 and 4: 
“While many biopharmaceuticals require cold chain transportation, not all do. In fact, a 
significant proportion of biopharmaceuticals can now be delivered without refrigerated 
transportation. The supply chain innovations—such as sugar drying technology developed at 
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Nova Bio-Pharma and University of Oxford, for delivering vaccines in tropical African nations 
that lack a reliable cold chain network—have made their way into the biologic supply chains in 
the U.S. Biotech companies continue to spend research dollars on making their products 
amenable to sugar-drying storage and distribution. Because of this, a very small fraction of the 
volume of drugs delivered needs cold chain transportation.” 
Lastly, each scenario was assigned a vivid name that represented its essence [21]: Frenzy (Scenario 
1), Innovo-Nation (Scenario 2), Hiber-Nation (Scenario 3), and Zen (Scenario 4).  
 The scenario planning engagement between Medford and the research team began in June 
2010 and ended in September 2011. It took about eleven months from the start of the project until 
the scenarios were finalized. While this may seem excessively long, note that Medford and the 
research team were engaged in a collaborative research project, where learning through the process 
was just as important—if not more—as developing the scenarios. The project team had remained 
engaged with the researchers during the entire scenario-creation process. One member of the project 
team (a Vice President of Operations) gave the following feedback voluntarily: “for me personally 
and my own professional development I found the experience challenging yet rewarding.  The times 
we as a team engaged and shared our thoughts openly was the most rewarding…learned new 
things, stretched the brain cells and found where at times my thoughts may be ‘out there’ that 
others were feeling the same thing”. 
5 Discussion 
This paper seeks to fill the well-known void of a theoretical foundation to the process of scenario 
development. It attempts to do so by defining the terms commonly used in the scenario literature, 
providing a set of axioms to guide scenario creation, and deriving a systematic process from those 
axioms and demonstrating its application. Below, we summarize how this approach compares to 
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some of the notable theorizing attempts in the scenario literature, identify our main contributions, 
highlight the limitations, and suggest some avenues for future research. 
5.1 Comparison to the existing theorizing attempts 
Chermack [26] made one of the first to attempts at theorizing scenario planning, which he described 
as “preliminary in nature”. Our framework differs from Chermack’s in that we focuses only on 
scenario development but provides a more nuanced set of axioms to guide the scenario creation 
process. The depth of theoretical basis also sets our framework apart from Saypong’s [29]. MacKay 
and Tambeau [27] used the structuration theory as a theoretical basis for developing scenarios. The 
roles of agency and structure—i.e. the ability and inability to influence a social system, 
respectively— from this theory are captured in our use of ability to influence conditions in the 
environment. However, our framework explicitly recognizes the bounded rationality of scenario 
creators and does not rely on the representative agents’ ability to correctly predict the consequences 
of their actions, which, according to the authors, are often unintended. The explicit treatment of 
bounded rationality in our axioms also sets our model apart from Burt’s [31] by stating which 
agents are likely to be more knowledgeable about different parts of the organizational environment 
being presented in the future scenarios.   
5.2 Contributions 
This research makes at least three contributions to the scholarly literature on scenario creation. The 
first contribution is the axiomatic foundation for developing scenarios. This serves two purposes. 
On one hand, it helps one discern an appropriate way to develop scenarios; on the other hand, it 
makes the “practitioner’s art” [21] open to scholarly critique—and improvement—by making the 
underlying assumptions explicit [67] and thus improving the methodological credibility of the 
process [19]. Systematic approaches have been developed to improve other business processes 
considered art, such as design [68, 69], creativity [56, 70], process improvement [71], etc. We 
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believe that scenario development would benefit from such an approach as well. The second 
contribution is the detailed scenario development process, which makes the generic Intuitive Logics 
School process operational. As articulated by Harries [72, p.800], “verification that a method or 
technique has been implemented is clearly a prerequisite to its validation or evaluation, especially 
when other nominally similar methods exist, as they do in scenario planning.” The third 
contribution is the precise definitions of terms used in the scenario creation process. This allays the 
challenge of working with “different and at times conflicting definitions” of the terms [2]. 
In addition, this research also has a few practical benefits. First, the scenario development 
process shows how to systematically combine the knowledge of organizational members with the 
expertise outside the organization, by leveraging the strengths of each, to develop a set of scenarios 
customized for a specific long-range decision. Second, the process requires the project team 
members to make explicit connections between the driving forces and the local factors. This step 
forces the participants to explore how macro-level environmental forces—which may get left out of 
scope of a quantitative planning process due to their unwieldy nature—can change the micro-level 
environmental factors that are easier to define in a quantitative model. The participants in several of 
our scenario workshops have mentioned that the discussions within the team about the nature of 
relationship between different pairs of driving forces and key local factors were enlightening. While 
our claim is rather anecdotal, several researches have noted the benefits of participating in the 
scenario development process [1, 9, 21, 73]. Scenario practitioners have also noted that “as scenario 
planning becomes more widely used [routinizing it using…] the right structured process can 
certainly help teams to extend their capabilities” [5, p.191]. 
5.3 Limitations 
The scenario creation process presented here is not without limitations. The biggest limitation is the 
flip-side of its strength: a step-by-step guide for creating scenarios. Given such a systematic 
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process, it is easy to get into an “auto-pilot” mode and go through the motions of completing 
various process steps without fully engaging in the process. Users of these processes need to guard 
against this tendency. In the Medford example, we allowed the project team members to alter the 
scenarios (in Step 6) developed using the process to make the scenarios more plausible in their 
minds. This eliminated some of the deliberately generated variations in the pairs of highly 
correlated driving forces. We believe that scenario users should have the final say in the scenario 
structure, after letting the process run its full course. However, we do not have concrete suggestions 
for when the process should be allowed to be superseded by user input. 
A second limitation is the use of quantitative tools. Managers and planners love numbers; 
converting an amorphous continuum of qualitative data into a number simplifies analysis. There is a 
danger of losing sight of the larger picture by focusing on the numbers alone. The quantitative 
methods used in the process here should be used only to focus the discussion. For instance, 
quantitative values of driving force impact should be used to separate the most impactful driving 
forces from the least impactful ones, but not to outright discard a driving force from consideration 
as a scenario axis because its impact is a fraction lower than the next most impactful driving force.  
Thirdly, the quality of the data – both qualitative and quantitative information about 
environment, analyses, insights, etc. – generated and captured in this process is a function of the 
people participating in the process as well as the group dynamics. If the scenario-creation process 
does not involve a diverse team, the process by itself is less likely to develop a diverse set of 
scenarios. Additionally, diversity of the input from individuals could be lost if the group suffers 
from concurrence-seeking tendencies like groupthink [74]. Selecting individuals from diverse 
perspectives and not quashing the diversity of opinion are important for the success of the scenario 
project.  
Finally, the approach presented in this work is geared towards developing firm-specific (i.e., 
corporate) scenarios, and does not seek to address the challenges faced in policy-oriented foresight 
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highlighted by van Asselt, et al. [16, pp. 50-56]. A set of axioms or guiding principles for policy 
foresight would be a useful complement to this work. 
5.4 Opportunities for future research 
In addition to the above, many opportunities for further research lie in the area of scenario creation. 
The foremost that became evident in this research was the need to compare different scenario 
creation methods. Such a comparison can determine the relative merits of different scenario creation 
processes. One may compare two sets of scenarios, created using two different approaches, to 
evaluate if one approach is superior to the other in terms of the quantity and/or quality of insights 
produced. Such results can inform the literature that empirically examines the cognitive effects of 
using scenarios [12,76,77]. One may also compare the output of various steps in the process by 
judging the quantity and/or quality of output (e.g. local factors identified, driving force-local factor 
associations made, etc.). Future research may perform empirical tests of the different scenario 
creation methods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that participation in the scenario creation process 
itself has benefits. One may test how participating in different steps of the scenario creation process 
(such as mapping driving forces to local factors) influences the participants’ understanding of their 
organization’s business environment and whether it makes the participants more sensitive to small 
changes (i.e. weak signals) in the environment. Finally, this paper presents a structured approach for 
creating scenarios in the Intuitive Logics tradition. However, it is not necessary to restrict ourselves 
to this school. By gaining better understanding of the process, one could engineer new processes for 
creating scenarios. Presenting those processes in an objective, replicable manner can make them 
amenable to comparison against other scenario-creation processes.  
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6 Conclusion 
Scenario development has been described as a “practitioner’s art” [23]. The absence of a theoretical 
foundation [67] has led to a proliferation of scenario creation methods, with no easy way of 
critiquing or comparing them. This has been noted as one of the limitations of the scenario planning 
literature by the field’s leading scholars [20, 75]. The present paper takes a step in addressing this 
limitation. We provide a theoretical basis for developing scenarios in the form of a set of axioms, 
apply it to create a structured process for developing scenarios, and illustrate the process by 
applying it to create four scenarios for a U.S. pharmaceutical distributor. We hope that the explicit 
statement of axioms and the structured process presented in this work not only benefit the practice 
of scenario creation, but also contribute to theoretical advancement through their scholarly critique. 
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Figure 1: Terms used in the scenario development process 
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Can the organization influence the element? 
Element of 
Focal Decision 
Yes 
Yes No 
Local Factor Driving Force 
Yes No 
Trend Uncertainty 
Is value over planning horizon predictable? 
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Figure 2: Variables in scenario creation process 
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Figure 3: Impact and uncertainty of local factors 
  
 (49) 
Tables 
Scenario Development 
Process Step 
Data Source 
Data 
Collection 
Method 
Expected Output 
Relevant 
Axioms 
1 Define scope of the 
scenario planning 
project 
Leader of the 
organization 
Discussion 
Statement of focal 
decision 
1 
- 
Planning horizon for the 
focal decision 
1 
- 
Organizational functions 
in and out of project scope 
1 
- Formation of project team 1, 2 
2 Identify key factors in 
the local environment 
Team 
members 
Interview, 
Brainstorming 
List of local factors 3 
3 Identify and assess 
driving forces 
External 
experts and 
team 
members 
Industry 
research 
List of driving forces 4 
- 
Level of uncertainty of 
each driving force  
4 Rank by importance 
and uncertainty 
Team 
members 
Questionnaire 
Impact of each local factor 
on focal decision 
5, 6 
- - List of key local factors 
 
Team 
members 
Questionnaire 
Strength of relationship 
between each driving force 
and key local factor 
7 
- - 
Impact of each driving 
force  
5 Select scenario logic 
- - 
Correlations between 
driving forces  
Team 
members 
Discussion Scenario seeds 8 
6 Flesh out the scenarios 
Team 
members 
- 
Validated scenario 
structures 
8, 9 
- 
Narratives for each 
scenario 
9 
- Scenario names 
 
Table 1: Guidelines for developing structured scenario development process 
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Driving forces in Medford’s environment 
Number of drivers by source 
IBISWorld Medford Total 
UNCERTAINTIES    
 Availability of healthcare workers 5 1 6 
 Availability of information and technology solutions for 
healthcare management 
3 2 5 
 Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments 1 2 2 
 Complexity of US healthcare supply chain 0 6 6 
 Consolidation within healthcare sector 6 4 7 
 Cost pressure in the healthcare sector 4 5 8 
 Health of the overall U.S. economy 7 1 8 
 Health-consciousness of average citizen 3 4 6 
 Location where majority of healthcare is provided 1 1 2 
 Nature of reimbursement policies 0 4 4 
 Overall focus on drug security and safety 0 1 1 
 Participation of government in the healthcare sector 4 4 7 
 Proportion of generic drugs in the drugs consumed 6 6 9 
 Volume of drugs sold in the US 1 3 4 
TRENDS    
 Average age of the US population 6 1 6 
 Environmental consciousness of the society 0 1 1 
Table 2: Driving forces in Medford’s environment and underlying drivers 
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Absolute impact of key local factor  1.26 1.55 1.65 1.32 1.15 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.35 1.60 1.10 1.75 1.30 
COV of uncertainty of key local factor  1.92 0.95 1.64 1.08 12.50 16.67 1.54 1.31 5.00 1.04 0.83 0.71 2.53 
DF1: Availability of healthcare workers 7 0.86 0.29 0.57 0.71 0.29 0.29 0.43 0.00 0.14 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.00 6.9 3.8 
DF2: Availability of IT solutions for healthcare 
management 7 
0.43 0.86 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.14 0.71 0.71 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.57 9.2 4.4 
DF3: Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments 8 0.00 0.88 0.38 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.25 0.88 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.25 12.8 5.8 
DF4: Complexity of US healthcare supply chain 5 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.80 15.3 6.3 
DF5: Consolidation within healthcare sector 7 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.29 0.86 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.14 13.4 5.7 
DF6: Cost pressure in the healthcare sector 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.71 0.86 0.71 0.29 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.29 15.5 6.2 
DF7: Health of the overall U.S. economy 8 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.38 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.88 0.63 0.25 13.2 5.7 
DF8: Health-consciousness of average citizen 7 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.29 4.9 4.3 
DF9: Location where majority of healthcare is 
provided 7 
0.43 0.71 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.43 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.29 11.8 5.9 
DF10: Nature of reimbursement policies 6 0.50 0.83 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.83 0.50 10.4 5.2 
DF11: Overall focus on drug security and safety 7 0.00 0.57 0.14 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.71 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.57 0.71 1.00 11.7 5.2 
DF12: Participation of government in the 
healthcare sector 7 
0.43 1.00 0.57 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.71 0.14 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.86 1.00 14.0 6.3 
DF13: Proportion of generic drugs in the drugs 
consumed 6 
0.17 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 10.7 5.5 
DF14: Volume of drugs sold in the US 7 0.14 1.00 0.14 0.57 0.71 0.86 0.86 0.57 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.86 0.43 12.8 6.0 
Table 3: Analysis of driving forces: Strength of relationship with key local factors, impact, and uncertainty 
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Driving force High Low 
UNCERTAINTIES CHOSEN AS SCENARIO AXES 
Complexity of US healthcare supply chain High Low 
Health of the overall U.S. economy Stronger Weaker 
OTHER UNCERTAINTIES   
Availability of healthcare workers Abundant Scarce 
Availability of information for managing healthcare Abundant 
Not much different 
than today 
Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments 
Temperature-
sensitive drugs 
Temperature-
insensitive drugs 
Consolidation within healthcare sector High Low 
Cost pressure in the healthcare sector High Low 
Health-consciousness of average citizen High Low 
Number of locations where majority of healthcare is 
provided 
Much higher than 
today 
Lower or about the 
same as today 
Nature of reimbursement policies Outcome focused Treatment focused 
Overall focus on drug security and safety High Low 
Participation of government in the healthcare sector High Low 
Proportion of generic drugs in the drugs consumed 
Much higher than 
today 
Not much different 
than today 
Volume of drugs sold in the US 
Much higher than 
today 
Not much different 
than today 
TRENDS   
Average age of U.S. population Higher than today Higher than today 
Environmental consciousness of the society in the U.S. Higher than today Higher than today 
Table 4: High and low values of uncertainties in Medford’s environment 
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DF1 Availability of healthcare workers 
             DF2 Availability of IT solutions for healthcare management -0.37 
            DF3 Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments -0.03 -0.12 
           DF4 Complexity of US healthcare supply chain 0.14 0.16 0.32 
          DF5 Consolidation within healthcare sector 0.57 0.10 0.29 0.37 
         DF6 Cost pressure in the healthcare sector 0.61 0.02 0.39 0.51 0.92 
        DF7 Health of the overall U.S. economy 0.08 0.41 -0.06 0.04 0.70 0.51 
       DF8 Health-consciousness of average citizen -0.04 -0.52 0.22 -0.13 -0.34 -0.25 -0.56 
      DF9 Location where majority of healthcare is provided 0.19 -0.38 0.67 0.10 0.30 0.25 -0.10 0.63 
     DF10 Nature of reimbursement policies 0.22 -0.01 0.53 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.12 0.05 0.39 
    DF11 Overall focus on drug security and safety -0.76 0.26 0.30 -0.27 -0.57 -0.60 -0.31 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 
   DF12 Participation of government in the healthcare sector -0.19 0.08 0.44 0.69 0.22 0.29 -0.04 0.18 0.32 0.68 -0.01 
  DF13 Proportion of generic drugs in drugs consumed -0.24 0.31 0.32 0.52 0.27 0.27 0.40 -0.05 0.14 0.54 -0.12 0.52 
 DF14 Volume of drugs sold in the US -0.45 0.21 0.71 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.03 0.51 0.51 0.40 0.58 0.60 
Table 5: Correlations between driving forces 
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Driving forces Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
SCENARIO LOGIC (UNCERTAINTIES)  
DF4: Complexity of US healthcare 
supply chain 
High High Low Low 
DF7: Health of the overall U.S. 
economy 
Weaker Stronger Weaker Stronger 
OTHER UNCERTAINTIES  
DF1: Availability of healthcare 
workers 
Abundant Scarce Abundant Scarce 
DF2: Availability of information for 
managing healthcare 
Not much different 
than today 
Not much 
different than 
today 
Abundant Abundant 
DF3: Climate-sensitivity of drugs and 
treatments 
Temperature-
insensitive drugs 
Temperature-
sensitive drugs 
Temperature-
sensitive drugs 
Temperature-
insensitive drugs 
DF5: Consolidation within healthcare 
sector 
High Low High Low 
DF6: Cost pressure in the healthcare 
sector 
High High Low Low 
DF8: Health-consciousness of 
average citizen 
High High Low Low 
DF9: Number of locations where 
majority of healthcare is provided 
Much higher than 
today 
Much higher 
than today 
Lower or about 
the same as 
today 
Much higher than 
today 
DF10: Nature of reimbursement 
policies 
Outcome focused 
Outcome 
focused 
Treatment 
focused 
Treatment 
focused 
DF11: Overall focus on drug security 
and safety 
High High High High 
DF12: Participation of government in 
the healthcare sector 
High High High Low 
DF13: Proportion of generic drugs in 
the volume of drugs consumed 
Much higher than 
today 
Much higher 
than today 
Much higher 
than today 
Not much 
different than 
today 
DF14: Volume of drugs sold in the 
US 
Not much different 
than today 
Much higher 
than today 
Much higher 
than today 
Not much 
different than 
today 
TRENDS 
DF15: Average age of U.S. 
population 
higher than today 
higher than 
today 
higher than 
today 
higher than today 
DF16: Environmental consciousness 
of the society in the U.S 
higher than today 
higher than 
today 
higher than 
today 
higher than today 
Table 6: Final structure of Medford scenarios 
 
